2010年6月巴菲特CNBC专访（中+英）

是川银藏

巴菲特本周出席美国国会的一个听证会，以调查诸如穆迪、标准普尔等评级机构在金融危机期间，是否利用自己的特许权做出错误评级，从而恶化金融危机。巴菲特表示，不仅评级机构，我们大家都对危机负有责任。以下是CNBC主持人奎克(BECKY QUICK)事后专访了巴菲特。
　　以下是其观点实录：
　　所有利益链条应该责任共担
　　巴菲特：我认为评级机构中的人像其他人一样也犯了错。显然人们重视评级，而评级机构的评估系统有一个模式，但可以说我从来没有见过这种模式，但它肯定得出过结论，称住房价格不可能暴跌，不可能在全国范围内暴跌。从某种意义上说，它们可能认为问题不一定互相关联。这是一种错误的模式。房地美(Freddie Mac)、房利美(Fannie Mae)、美国国会、媒体、我、投资者以及购房者都有责任。因此，那是一种泡沫心态，这种泡沫心态不仅深入到评级机构所采用的模式之中，也出现在其他机构的模式里。
　　评级机构的评级一夜之间就从AA级降到了D级，这表明评级系统存在着巨大的问题。这是整体经济模式中的一个重大缺陷。基本上，美国公众形成了一个认知模式，认为房价不可能崩溃。而那是一个很大的泡沫，可能是我见过的最大泡沫。当它破裂时，A级就成了D级了。评级机构为美国所有抵押贷款中的40%提供担保。他们拥有数以百万计的抵押贷款、借款人、抵押贷款经纪人以及其他所有人的数据。2007年3月30日，监管评级机构的美国联邦房地产企业监管办公室 (OFHEO)向国会提交一份报告称，评级机构质地优良。我们都参与了一个巨大的泡沫。这倒不是为评级机构开脱责任。这意味着他们没有能力发现到几乎所有人都认为不可能出现的预警信号。
　　市场要求我由标准普尔和穆迪来评级
　　标准普尔(Standard and Poor's)和穆迪(Moody's)就是伯克希尔(Berkshire)的基准。市场要求我由标准普尔和穆迪来评级。这样的要求有多种原因。第一，穆迪和标准普尔是市场上的主要评级机构，它们无处不在。它们的存在已经深入到各项监管规定之中。各地政府都有让保险公司和评级机构挂钩的规定。而且评级机构是指定的。所以我不能随便找一家评级机构说，“你们能否将其价格评为原来的一半?”那不会被任何人认可的。事实上，市场上存在其它竞争对手。这里面有些问题。让我们假设一下，你创办了一家评级公司，然后对我说，“我会给你评成一半的价钱。”我喜欢这个结果，但唯一的麻烦是，它对我不会有任何好处。
　　人们会说，如果有10家评级机构，那么其中任意一家都是可以接受的。但问题是，这其中有一个微妙之处，因为如果有10个评级机构可以选择，那么我的选择可能出于一、两个原因，那就是价格和评判标准的宽严。在一定意义上说，由一、两家公司垄断这个市场，意味着评级机构可以独立行事。我认为，市场将继续要求从著名评级机构获得评级。我也希望不出现这种情况。因为当评级机构为伯克希尔评级时，他们就可以要挟我。如果他们要我花100万美元才行，然后我问为什么不是90万美元呢?但我对此没有任何办法。因此，如果有10家机构存在，我就可以说，“我要选择最便宜的。”人们会说：“你选择了最便宜的，但它们做不了这项工作，”或者诸如此类的话。因此，这不是一个容易解决的问题。我们作为买方的解决方案是，我们不使用评级机构。我们自己给交易对象评级，不将之外包给评级机构。但其他人不像我们这样，而且监管规定有这样的要求，因此评级机构自然形成了如今这种双寡头格局。它具有世界上最伟大的商业模式之一。如果你研究一下标准普尔或穆迪的投入资本回报率就知道了，它们拥有定价权。如果你想知道某家公司的业务模式好不好，只是问它们是否有能力马上提价就行。十年前，看起来什么问题都不会出现，现在有可能出问题了。但它仍然是一个伟大的商业模式。我们有一家名为伯克希尔哈撒韦保险的公司，我们必须得到标准普尔和穆迪的评级。
　　金融危机的真正原因是房地产泡沫
　　如果我预料到这一天，我会在60或70美元的价格卖出我的穆迪股票。所以我也不是个多么聪明的投资者。金融危机的真正原因是房地产泡沫。它是美国民众最大的资产类别，它是66%或67%美国人投资的资产之一，而且他们都采用了杠杆工具。另外还有很多其它原因。但如果没有出现房地产泡沫，如果66%或 67%的美国民众都动用百分之一百的保证金来买股票——保证金是导致泡沫流行的东西——那也会造成金融市场出现一个大泡沫。但是，房地产是最大的资产类别。美国经济正在复苏。特别是在3月、4月和5月，加速复苏的势头出现了。因此，就商业行为而言，发生在欧洲的危机并没有对我们这里造成影响。那是一个危险的局势，但迄今为止我们的经济复苏仍正常进行。我们每星期都在增加就业机会。欧洲出现了非常严重的问题。大多数经济体都曾经历过严重的问题。现在它们也出现了。
　　我对我们这个国家总是乐观的。我对美国经济持乐观态度。我对亚洲感到乐观。可能存在一些我不太了解的市场机制，需要改进。但是，这并未让我对经济或市场的基本面产生怀疑。
　　CNBC INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT: Warren Buffett on Moody's & Credit Ratings Agencies
　　www.cnbc.com/id/37472016
　　Published: Wednesday, 2 Jun 2010 | 1:42 PM ET
　　Text Size
　　By: Alex Crippen
　　*
　　This is a transcript of Warren Buffett's live interview on CNBC before appearing before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on Wednesday, June 2, 2010.
　　It is also available here for download as a PDF document.
　　CNBC's BECKY QUICK:  We are standing by at the New School where we'll be hearing from the FCIC Commission in just a little bit.  We're gonna be asking some questions.  They are in progress right now, where they are talking to a lot of — of the people who are coming forth as witnesses.  In the second session of witnesses, one of those will be Warren Buffett.  And we are joined right now by Warren Buffett of Berkshire Hathaway.  And Mr. Buffett, thank you for being with us.
　　WARREN BUFFETT:  Pleasure.
　　BECKY:  You are here today — not of your own free will —
　　BUFFETT:   (LAUGH) That's right.
　　BECKY:  — you were subpoenaed for this.
　　BUFFETT:  Yeah.
　　BECKY:  Why did it take a subpoena to get you here?
　　BUFFETT:  Well, in the last 12 or 15 months, I've had eight different — either congressional committees or — commissions appointed by congressional committees — who have asked me to go to Washington, primarily to testify.  And I've always offered to do anything they want by phone, and answer all their questions, and I just did it last week for Elizabeth Warren's commission, for example.
　　And they had a number of people on the phone, and I — I answered all their questions, and told them if they wanted more to come back.  But I've got a job running Berkshire, and I — if I — if I go to one voluntarily, I'm gonna have ten others that say, "Why d — why can't you come and do it for us?"
　　BECKY:  But having said that, you're not gonna be a hostile witness today —
　　BUFFETT:  Oh, I'm not hostile.  (LAUGH)
　　BECKY:  You'll tell 'em what they're asking?
　　BUFFETT:  I'll tell 'em — I'll tell 'em whatever I know.  And I've already had a two hour interview — with their staff a week ago, they came out to Omaha.  And — and we had a good session.  They asked good questions, good follow on questions.  And —
　　BECKY:  The — the focus today is going to be on the role that the ratings agencies played in the financial downturn.  What — what role do you think the fi — the — ratings agencies played?
　　BUFFETT:  Well, I think they were wrong like everybody else.  (LAUGH) They — obviously people pay attention to ratings, and they had a model in — in their — rating system, but basically — I — I — I've never seen the model, but it must have said that — that — house prices — residential house prices can't take a dive, and that they won't take a dive all over the country.
　　That they — to some extent, they probably thought they were not necessarily correlated with each other.  And — and that was — that was a fallacious model, it was held by Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, the U.S. Congress, the media, me, (LAUGH) investors, and— and home buyers all over.  So it was— it was part of a bubble mentality, and that bubble mentality got incorporated into— into models used by not only rating agencies, but others.
　　BECKY:  But when you have ratings agencies that go from an A or— a AA rating overnight to a D, I mean, that shows that there's a huge problem with the— the system that's been set up—
　　BUFFETT:  There was a huge flaw in the model.  That w— basically, the American public had a model that— where they didn't think house prices could— could crash.  And— and a very, very, very big bubble, probably the biggest I've ever seen, popped.  And when it popped— A's became D's and so on.  That—
　　BECKY:  But that makes it sound like you think it's a problem not with the rating agencies' models, but with— everyone's model that was looking at this.  There— there are a lotta questions now about whether there's an inherent conflict of interest just with the ratings agencies' models themselves.
　　BUFFETT:  No, I— I think everybody's mo— I mean, if you— if— who knew more about mortgages than Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae?  I mean, they were guaranteeing 40 percent of all the mortgage in the United States.  They had data on millions and millions and millions of mortgages, borrowers, mortgage brokers, everybody else.
　　And— in March 30th of 2007, in the report to Congress that was prepared by OFHEO who oversaw them, they said that the— that their quality was good.  It— we— we participated in a huge bubble.  That does— that doesn't necessarily excuse the rating agencies, but it— but it— but it—
　　BECKY:  Yeah, does it let them off the hook?
　　BUFFETT:  —but it— it— it— it means that they were not inca— they were incapable of thinking— at great variants with how almost everybody thought.
　　BECKY:  But is there a better model for rating agencies overall?  Right now, you have the companies that are— are being judged, paying the bill.  And they get to shop around—
　　BUFFETT:  Right, I'm paying a big bill at Berkshire.
　　BECKY:  Well— and you get to shop around, and— and go to different—
　　BUFFETT:  No, I don't get to— I— I don't get to shop around.  That's the— I— I— Standard and Poor's and Moody's are— are the— are totally the benchmarks for Berkshire.  I would love to shop around.  (LAUGH) Believe me, I have no pricing— no— no negotiating power with either Standard and Poor's or Moody's.
　　And best as a specialist in the insurance field too.  But believe me, if somebody came and offered me ratings of half the price of Standard and Poor's or Moody's, I would love to do it, but I can't do it.  The— the market demands that I be rated by Standard and Poor's and Moody's.
　　BECKY:  The market demands it because of the government— laws that are set up requiring—
　　BUFFETT:  They— it— it demands it for— for a couple reasons.  One is Moody's and Standard and Poor's were there first, they've been around forever.  They got enshrined into various regulatory— regulations.  I mean, I— as a life in— we have a life insurance company.  It tells us— what we can do in terms of BBB or in terms of A and all of that sort of thing.
　　So state after state has regulations relating to insurance companies that ties in with the rating agencies.  And the agencies are specified.  And so I can't go to the XYZ rating agency and say, "Will you do this for half the price," and have it accepted by anybody.
　　BECKY:  Do you think though that there's an inherent flaw, just back to the question.  Is there a problem with the business model right now for the ratings agencies?  Would it be better if there were other competitors who could get in?
　　BUFFETT:  Well, there are other competitors, but— but they—
　　BECKY:  Again?
　　BUFFETT:  —and— and— there are issues there.  But— but let's just say you start a rating agency, you know, and— and you say— come around and say, "I'll do it for half the price."  I love that, the only trouble is, it won't do me any good.  (LAUGH)
　　BECKY:  But is there a way to change the system?  I think what the commission's going to be getting at today is what changes need to be— made to this—
　　BUFFETT:  Well they could—
　　BECKY:  —particular business model.
　　BUFFETT:  They— they could say any one of ten rating agencies was acceptable.  And the— the problem is— there's— there's a really nuanced point in this, because if you have ten rating agencies out there, and I can choose among them, I'm gonna choose for one of two reasons, maybe both, price and laxity.  I mean, in a sense, the— having a monopoly or a duopoly arrangement, means that the rating agencies can be independent of the people.
　　They— they— it's— it's the same problem, you know, basically as with newspapers.  If you have ten newspapers in a town, and they're getting their revenue from the local department stores and grocery stores and so on, they are likely to be less independent than if there's only one newspaper, because that newspaper can thumb their nose and the department (LAUGH) store still has to buy ads in the paper.
　　BECKY:  Right, there are— are two proposals in congress that have gotten a lotta play.  One is from senate— is from Congressman Barney Frank who takes a look at— this idea that— "Look, we're just not going to give them the government mandate for them to be required anymore, so that will therefore create a lotta competition in the marketplace."  The other is from Senator Al Franken, who says, "We'll set up a government oversight board that tells you where you're going to go to get your ratings."  Do either of those models make sense?
　　BUFFETT:  Well, I'd have to see more details on it.  I— I— I think that the market will continue to demand from the brand names.  I mean, I— I wish it weren't the case.  I mean, when the rating agency comes to rate Berkshire, they have me by the throat.  You know, if they say that it's gonna cost me a million dollars, and I say, "You know, why can't you do this for $900,000?"  The— the— I have— I have— no leverage whatsoever.
　　So— if there were ten agencies, and I could say, "I'd like the cheapest."  People will say, "Well, you took the cheapest, but they— they gave you— you know, they didn't do the work," or something to the sort.  So it's— it's— it's not an easy answer.
　　BECKY:  So there's not necessarily a clear solution that cuts out any sort of conflict of interest along the line?
　　BUFFETT:  No, our— our solution as a buyer securities is we don't use rating agencies.  I mean, I— I don't think— and I don't— and I doubt if BIMCO does, for example, or BlackRock.  I mean, our— our— our job is to rate credit ourselves.  We do not outsource that to rating agencies.  But the world does, and it has all these regulations built in.  So the rating agencies sort of evolved into this natural duopoly.  That's what made it a good investment but tough to—
　　BECKY:  I was gonna say— (LAUGHTER) you don't use the ratings agencies, but you're the largest investor in Moody's—
　　BUFFETT:  Yeah, it— it had— it— it had one of the world's great business models.  If you look at the return on invested capital for Standard & Poor's or Moody's, it's practically infant.  So they have the power to price.  And if you wanna know one question to ask in terms of determining whether somebody's got a good business or not, just ask 'em whether they can raise prices tomorrow.
　　BECKY:  You know, that's interesting, though you— when you first that talking, you said, "They had a great business model."  Is that business model gone?
　　BUFFETT:  It's not gone at the moment, but it's— it's— it's perhaps threatened in some way.  And— and— and the— ten years ago, it looked like nothing would happen to it, and now there's the possibility of something happening to it.  It's still a great business model.  I mean, I have to get rated— we have a company called Berkshire Hathaway Assurance.  We have to get a rating from Standard & Poor's and Moody's.
　　BECKY:  You have been selling your stake— you're still the largest sell— shareholder, but you've been selling your stake.  If you had your druthers, would you own no Moody stock at this point?
　　BUFFETT:  No, if I— if— if that were the case, I would've sold it all.  (LAUGH) It depends on the price, it depends on alternative investments.  But it does not have the bullet proof situation that it had ten years ago.
　　BECKY:  That's why you've been selling?
　　BUFFETT:  Well, that— that is a reason.  It's a big reason, but it's not the only reason.  But it's what we can do with the money and what price we're getting for it.
　　BECKY:  Is the political spotlight, the regulatory spotlight with the problems with the— with the ratings agencies another reason?
　　BUFFETT:  That threatens the bulletproof franchise.  (LAUGH) Yeah.
　　BECKY:  I mean, as an— as an investor, you— you talk all the time about the companies that you're highly invested in.  Do you know the CEO of— of Moody's well?
　　BUFFETT:  I wouldn't know if I saw him, I— I met him once three or four years ago, but I'm not very good on names (LAUGH) and faces, so I will be sitting next to him today, and— and— you know, I hope they don't put somebody else in there, or I'll c— (LAUGH) I'll call him by the wrong name.
　　BECKY:  The other— there are a lotta questions that come up, though.  Are you proud of the work that Moody's has done—
　　BUFFETT:  I— I—
　　BECKY:  —as an investor?
　　BUFFETT:  —I think— listen, if I'd seen this coming, I would've sold my Moody stock at 60 or 70 too.  So I— I wasn't a lot smarter myself.
　　BECKY:  Okay.  There was an— a column that was written yesterday by Andrew Ross Sorkin of The New York Times and it's asked a question at the bottom, he proposed a lotta questions—
　　BUFFETT:  Uh-huh.
　　BECKY:  —he'd be asking if he were on this commission today.  One of this is that— you sold a lot of your— you sold a stake in Moody's a week after they received the Wells Notice.  Did you know about that Wells Notice?
　　BUFFETT:  No, I never— never heard of it till I read— read about it the other day.  I— we started selling it a year ago, and we had 48 million shares, we sold about 18 million shares over the last year, and it's— it's been when the price is up to some degree.  And once it was publicized that we'd sold stock, every now and then a dealer the would have a bid for 100,000 shares, or something, would come in.  But— no, I had no notion that they had a Wells Notice.
　　BECKY:  You said today on The Today Show that— you thought the real reason for the financial crisis was— housing and the housing bubble.
　　BUFFETT:  It— it— it was the housing bubble.  I mean, there are a lot of other things that entered in, but— but if we hadn't had the housing bubble— and everything that went with it when it popped, and— and you know, it was the largest asset class to the American public, and it's one of 66 or 67 percent of the American public had an investment in it, and they were leveraged in it.  So, you know, if s— if 66 or 67 percent of the American public had stocks margined to the hilt, and something caused that bubble to pop, that would've been a big pop too.  But this was— the was the biggest asset class, you know?  (LAUGH)
　　BECKY:  You know, there are a lotta people who are worried about what's happening in Europe right now.  How big of an impact is that having on the economy?  Because the last time we spoke with you, you thought the economy was really moving along at quite a clip.
　　BUFFETT:  The economy's picking up steam.  And particular March, April, and May, it's— it's— it's shown some acceleration.  So what's happening in Europe has not had an effect here yet in— in terms of our businesses.  It's— it's a dangerous situation, but— but— but so far our recovery is coming along.  We're hiring every week.
　　BECKY:  You're hiring every week at Berkshire—
　　BUFFETT:  Every week, yeah.
　　BECKY:  (General Electric CEO) Jeff Immelt though, said, when he looked at the European economy, it's tottering right now.
　　BUFFETT:  Yeah.
　　BECKY:  Can that catch up?  Is that— a wave that can kind of wash over us?
　　BUFFETT:  Well, it's something I'll watch with great interest.  (LAUGH) They have— they have— you know, they have a very severe problem over there.  And— and most economies get through most severe problems.  But— but they have one right now.
　　BECKY:  Are you more optimistic or less optimistic than you were a month ago?
　　BUFFETT:  I'm always optimistic about the country.
　　BECKY:  But do you feel optimistic about the country, let's just talk about the economy.  You feel better or you feel worse—
　　BUFFETT:  Oh I feel— I feel optimistic about the U.S. economy, sure.
　　BECKY:  But the global economy?
　　BUFFETT:  Well, I feel optimistic about Asia.  (LAUGHTER)
　　BECKY:  You feel optimistic about—
　　BUFFETT:  Antarctica I'm big on.
　　BECKY:   (LAUGH) Okay.  When the flash crash came up, and it disrupted the trading, and we saw this massive drop of over 1,000 points in the Dow, it raised a lotta people's concerns about how stable the markets are.  Do you have any concerns?
　　BUFFETT:  No, no it doesn't affect, you know, we're still out there selling what we sell, and the— the world wasn't gonna change.  It c— it could've been a cyber attack.  I didn't know what was going on there for 15 or 20 minutes.  And— and— but it didn't make any difference.  I mean, it doesn't make any difference on Saturday and Sunday when the markets are closed, right?  (LAUGH)
　　BECKY:  But do you th— do you have confidence that the markets function properly, or do you think there's more that needs to be done?
　　BUFFETT:  We'll, they— they— prob— there's probably some mechanical aspect that I don't understand, that needs work on.  But— but— but— no, that did not raise fundamental questions in my mind about either the economy or the market.
　　BECKY:  Okay, and again, as you're getting ready to head in today to speak to this (Commission, is there anything you want to make) sure you impart to them?
　　BUFFETT:  No, I'll— I'll be there to answer their questions.  I don't have an opening statement.
　　BECKY:  In terms of the meetings that they had with you beforehand, did they focus mostly on the ratings agencies or was it— a broad range of questions?
　　BUFFETT:  No, I talked to them for two hours, and there wasn't more than ten minutes on rating agencies.  So it was a surprise to me to find out that I was going to appear with six people from Moody's.  They— they did not indicate that to me in any way, shape, or form.
　　BECKY:  All right, well Warren, we wanna thank you very much for your time ahead of this, and we'll be watching the hearing today.
　　BUFFETT:  Okay, thank you.
　　LJW